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Since the Cold War’s end, many analysts have expected China and Russia to co-operate vigorously to counter U.S. geopolitical superiority.1 Although Chinese
and Russian leaders have collaborated on some issues, substantial obstacles have
impeded their forming an anti-American bloc. This failure of the two strongest
countries with both the capacity and (arguably) incentives to counterbalance
U.S. power and influence in world affairs suggests why the United States contin-
ues to enjoy unprecedented global preeminence. This article analyzes why Rus-
sia and China have not allied against the United States and offers policy
recommendations on how to avert such an anti-U.S. bloc in the future.
At their third November summit in 1997, Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin (then the
presidents of their respective countries) set for their two countries the goal of estab-
lishing a “strategic partnership for the twenty-first century.” During subsequent
meetings, they reaffirmed this commitment and jointly criticized NATO’s interven-
tion in Kosovo, U.S. plans to develop ballistic missile defenses (BMD), and other
American policies they opposed. The many comparable
statements by representatives of the two governments,
the large number of meetings between senior Chinese
and Russian officials, and Russia’s extensive arms sales to
China intensified expectations that the two govern-
ments would form an anti-American bloc.2 At this time,
U.S. intelligence agencies undertook a major initiative to
analyze evolving Chinese-Russian relations and their
implications for the United States.3
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Notwithstanding these plausible expectations, however, the normalization of
Chinese-Russian relations during the past decade has proceeded for reasons
mostly unrelated to any joint effort to counterbalance the United States. For in-
stance, the quality of Russian arms purchased by China has been impressive, but
these transactions alone do not constitute a Chinese-Russian military alliance.
Furthermore, the two countries’ policies on a range of important issues have been
uncoordinated and often conflicting. Finally, although the two governments have
signed border and other security agreements signifying the end of their Cold War
hostility, nondefense economic ties and societal contacts between Russia and
China have remained minimal compared to those found between most friendly
countries, let alone allies.
POST–COLD WAR IMPROVEMENTS IN RUSSIAN-CHINESE
RELATIONS
Chinese-Russian relations improved along several important dimensions dur-
ing the 1990s, but how one assesses the extent and significance of these changes
depends on what metric and starting point one uses. For example, ties between
Moscow and Beijing might be said simply to have experienced a “regression to-
ward the mean” from their excessively poor state during the 1960s, 1970s, and
early 1980s. The changes look so impressive only because Sino-Soviet relations
were so problematic before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet
Union in 1985. Ties between Russia and China have come to resemble those one
would expect to exist between two neighboring countries sharing important in-
terests and concerns but differing on many others. Indeed, despite recent im-
provements, relations between China and Russia remain less harmonious than
those existing between Germany and France, the United States and Mexico, or
Russia and India.
Border Stability and Arms Control
During the past decade, China and Russia largely have resolved the boundary
disputes that engendered armed border clashes in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
and they have demilitarized their lengthy, 2,640-mile shared frontier. (The sec-
tion to the east of the Russian-Mongolian border is 2,606 miles long; that to the
west is thirty-four miles.)4
Border demilitarization talks began in November 1989. They soon split into
parallel negotiations, one on reducing military forces along the Chinese-Russian
frontier, the other on establishing confidence and security building measures in
the border region. In July 1994, the Russian and Chinese defense ministers
agreed to a set of practices to forestall incidents. These measures included ar-
rangements to avert unauthorized ballistic missile launches, prevent the
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jamming of communications equipment, and warn ships and aircraft that might
inadvertently violate national borders. In September of that year, Chinese and
Russian authorities pledged not to target strategic nuclear missiles at each other.
They also adopted a “no first use” nuclear weapons posture with respect to each
other.5 In April 1998, China and Russia established a direct presidential hot
line—China’s first with another government.6 China has also signed multilateral
security agreements with all the adjoining former Soviet republics.
These security agreements reflect a common Chinese and Russian desire to
manage instability in the volatile neighboring region of Central Asia.7 At their
December 1999 encounter, Jiang told Yeltsin, “China is ready to cooperate with
Russia, and make use of the meeting mechanism between China, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the links with Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan, in order to promote stability in Central Asia.”8 Both governments
fear ethnic separatism in their border territories, emanating in part from Islamic
fundamentalist movements in Central Asia. Russian authorities dread the pros-
pect of continued instability in the northern Caucasus, especially Chechnya and
neighboring Dagestan. China’s leaders worry about separatist agitation in the
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, where deadly uprisings have occurred
since the 1980s. Of the ten million non-Han Chinese in Xinjiang, eight million
are Turkic and have ethnic and religious links to neighboring Turkic popula-
tions in Central Asia.9 From Beijing’s perspective, the security agreements also
facilitated the favorable revision of its borders with Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.10 Chinese and Russian policy makers also have wor-
ried about the activities of Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United
States in Central Asia.
The institutional manifestation of these shared Chinese and Russian interests
in Central Asia initially was the so-called “Shanghai Five,” a loose grouping of
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. On 26 April 1996, the five
governments signed in Shanghai a treaty on military confidence-building mea-
sures that imposed restrictions on military deployments and activity within a
hundred-kilometer (sixty-two-mile) demilitarization zone along their mutual
frontiers. On 15 June 2001, these governments, along with Uzbekistan—a coun-
try that had not participated in the original Shanghai Five, which initially fo-
cused on border security, because it does not adjoin China—formally
established the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).11 (Both India and
especially Pakistan also have expressed interest in joining.)12 Building on the
arms control achievements of the Shanghai Five, the SCO has sponsored exten-
sive, senior-level consultations on several issues, including crime, narcotics traf-
ficking, economic development, transportation, communication, energy, the
war in Afghanistan, and terrorism, which has become its most important issue
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of concern. The parties are establishing concrete mechanisms to facilitate such
cooperation—including annual meetings of their defense, foreign, and prime
ministers—as well as formal structures to interact with nonmember govern-
ments and other international institutions. In particular, they agreed in Septem-
ber 2002 to form a SCO secretariat in Beijing, which will be headed by Zhang
Deguang, China’s current Russian-speaking ambassador to Moscow, who will
serve a three-year term as the SCO’s secretary general, supervising a four-
million-dollar budget.13 The previous year, they established a regional anti-
terrorist center to share intelligence and coordinate responses to terrorism.
The latter agency has an initial staff of approximately forty and resides in the
Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek, where a Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) antiterrorist center already functions.14 The SCO members also signed
a formal twenty-six-point charter in St. Petersburg on 7 June 2002, and a
“Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism”
at their June 2001 summit. (The juxtaposition of these three terms highlights the
priority the organization’s members place on countering ethnoseparatism and
antigovernment dissent as well as terrorism per se.) In October 2002 China and
Kyrgyzstan conducted the first bilateral antiterror exercise within the SCO
framework, involving joint border operations by hundreds of troops. It marked
the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s first maneuvers with another
country’s military.15 The Chinese military also transferred small arms, ammuni-
tion, and other military equipment to Kyrgyz security forces, and they have not
opposed neighboring Kyrgyzstan’s permitting Russian warplanes to deploy at
Kant airbase, near Bishkek, or the basing of U.S. forces at Manas International
Airport.16 Other SCO members have announced their intention to conduct
analogous exercises.
Since the USSR’s collapse, Chinese leaders have favored a preeminent security
role for Russia in Central Asia, as a hedge against untoward changes in the re-
gion’s political status quo and the growth of radical Islamic and American influ-
ence. They also believe a Russian-dominated regional security environment
would allow for the region’s economic development by Chinese and other firms,
especially in the important realm of energy, and permit China to concentrate on
more vital issues—such as Korea and Taiwan.17 The Russians have sought and wel-
comed this Chinese support. Through the SCO, Moscow recognizes as legitimate
Chinese interests in Central Asia, and China finds a mechanism to promote these
interests, in close cooperation with Russia. The newly independent states of Cen-
tral Asia have become not objects of rivalry between Moscow and Beijing, as was
once expected, but a major unifying element in Chinese-Russian relations.
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Mutually Supportive Policy Statements
During the past decade, Chinese-Russian joint statements typically have criti-
cized various American policies. Although these pronouncements normally
have not referred explicitly to the United States, the target was obvious. In place
of an American-dominated international system, the two governments fre-
quently have called for a “multipolar” world in which Russia and China would
occupy key positions, along with Europe, the United States, and perhaps Japan.
They evidently have hoped that such a system would establish a geopolitical bal-
ance that would prevent one great power (e.g., the United States) from dominat-
ing the others.
Chinese and Russian officials also regularly endorse each other’s domestic
policies. Russian representatives have not challenged China’s human rights
practices in Tibet or elsewhere, and they have not backed American-sponsored
UN resolutions criticizing its internal policies. For their part, Chinese officials
have expressed understanding for Russia’s military operations in Chechnya de-
spite other foreigners’ complaints about excessive civilian casualties.18 Such
statements have reflected both governments’ commitment to uphold traditional
interpretations of national sovereignty, which severely limit the right of external
actors to challenge a state’s internal policies. Russian and Chinese officials likely
have found it easier to interact with each other than with their Western interloc-
utors, who constantly importune them to improve their human rights and other
domestic practices.
Beijing and Moscow also frequently express a desire to strengthen the role of
the United Nations in international security. As permanent members of the Se-
curity Council, their vetoes (or even the threat of them, as was the case in March
2003 concerning the then-imminent Iraq invasion) allow them to prevent the
United States and its allies from obtaining formal UN endorsement of any mili-
tary operations they oppose. NATO’s decision to intervene in Kosovo without
UN approval evoked outrage and dismay in both capitals. China, Russia, and the
other governments of the Shanghai Five publicly affirmed at their July 2000
summit that “they will unswervingly promote the strengthening of the United
Nations’ role as the only universal mechanism for safeguarding international
peace and stability” and that they “oppose the use of force or threat of force in
international relations without the UN Security Council’s prior approval.”19
Russian Arms Sales to China
Russia’s arms sales to China have constituted the most salient dimension of the
growing security cooperation between the two countries. Since the two govern-
ments signed an agreement on military-technical cooperation in December
W E I T Z 4 3
1992, China has purchased more weapons from Russia than from all other coun-
tries combined. Estimates of the annual value of these deliveries range from
seven hundred million to a billion dollars during the 1990s, and 1.5 to two bil-
lion dollars during the three years ending in 2002.20 Since the resumption of Rus-
sian arms sales, China has ordered Su-27 and Su-30 advanced fighter aircraft,
Mi-17 transport helicopters, Il-72 transport aircraft, A-50 warning and control
aircraft, SA-10 and SA-15 air defense missiles, T-72 main battle tanks, armored
personnel carriers, Kilo-class diesel submarines, several Sovremenny-class de-
stroyers (equipped with supersonic Sunburn SS-N-22 antiship missiles), and
other advanced conventional military systems or their components. In 2002
alone, China reportedly ordered two Sovremenny destroyers and eight Kilo sub-
marines, and sought to buy forty Su-30 fighter-bombers.21 Furthermore, in Febru-
ary 1996 China bought a multiyear license from Russia to assemble two hundred
Su-27s (without the right to export them to third countries).22 Keeping these sys-
tems operational will require China to import Russian spare parts for years.23
Economic rather than strategic considerations largely explain Russia’s deci-
sion to sell advanced conventional weapons systems to China. Russia has both
surplus arms stocks and excess defense production capacity. This combination
has resulted in widespread insolvency among Russian defense firms, and high
unemployment and low wages in regions that had heavy concentrations of de-
fense enterprises in Soviet times.24 From 1991 to 1995, Russian government or-
ders for products of a military character fell by more than 90 percent.25 In 1998,
the Russian armed forces did not buy a single tank, aircraft, or nuclear subma-
rine.26 Russia’s leaders believe, however, that if it is to remain a great military
power, their country needs to maintain a healthy defense industry. They appre-
ciate that many Russian companies require increased investment to develop the
advanced systems that proved so effective for Western militaries in the Persian
Gulf, the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. They also have proven suscep-
tible to defense managers’ arguments that a revived Russian military-industrial
complex would help promote recovery in other economic sectors.27 Since the im-
poverished Russian government cannot place enough orders to keep its defense
enterprises healthy, Russian officials have encouraged the firms to sell their wares
abroad. By the end of the decade, Russian defense firms exported approximately
four-fifths of their armaments production.28
China and Russia, however, engage in other forms of military cooperation be-
sides arms sales. A 1993 agreement permitted the Chinese to recruit Russian
weapons specialists to work in China, and Russian aerospace institutes have em-
ployed Chinese ordnance experts.29 A Hong Kong newspaper reported in 2000
that Chinese enterprises had hired more than 1,500 weapons specialists (includ-
ing many in nuclear physics and aerodynamics) from the former Soviet
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republics.30 Another Hong Kong paper claimed that “hundreds” of Russian ex-
perts have helped develop China’s missile technology.31 The two countries also
regularly exchange officers and defense information expertise. In October 1999,
for example, the Chinese and Russian defense ministries agreed to discuss
changes in their military doctrines and to organize joint training.32 Frequent vis-
its take place between senior military officials, including annual meetings of de-
fense ministers.33 Contacts between midlevel military officers, especially those
in charge of border security units and military units in neighboring Chinese and
Russian territories, have grown as well. From 1991 to 1997, 5,205 Russian mili-
tary advisers went to China and 1,646 Chinese defense specialists graduated
from Russia’s military academies.34 The first Chinese-Russian naval exercise, be-
tween two warships of the Russian Pacific Fleet and vessels of the Chinese East
Sea Fleet, based in Shanghai, occurred in October 1999.
IMPEDIMENTS TO DEEPER GEOPOLITICAL COOPERATION
Managing their lengthy border demands a minimal level of cooperation be-
tween China and Russia. Their governments have had to work together to regu-
late trade and migration flows, resist such illegal transnational activities as
smuggling and narcotics trafficking, curb international terrorism and regional
separatism, and implement arms control and demilitarization agreements that
permit them to redeploy or reduce military units. They also perceive mutual
benefits (and a mutual dependence) in their arms trade. The Chinese govern-
ment seeks military modernization, and Russian companies need the money.
Nonmilitary Economic Ties Remain Limited
Russian-Chinese economic exchanges not involving arms sales also have grown
during the last decade, but much less dramatically. Russian consumers, unable
to afford newly available but expensive Western imports, initially showed great
interest in acquiring cheap Chinese products. The Russian government, besides
desiring to satisfy this demand and help China generate income to purchase
Russian arms, has also sought to entice Chinese investment in the impoverished
Russian Far East. A member of a Russian delegation visiting Beijing in March
2000 explained, “Russia wants to balance its trade with China so that it does not
depend so much on military sales. [It] also hopes to attract Chinese investment
into Russia.”35 Although most Chinese investors prefer more enticing opportu-
nities in Southeast Asia, Chinese merchants have eagerly sought to sell goods, in-
cluding food and services, to Russian consumers.
Despite these mutual interests, economic intercourse between Russia and
China has remained limited. Bilateral trade did triple between 1988 and 1993
(from $2.55 billion to $7.68 billion). The initiation of Russian arms sales to
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China provided the main impetus for this upswing, but a March 1992 bilateral
trade agreement and a relaxation of visa requirements, which encouraged pri-
vate traders to shuttle inexpensive manufactured goods and agricultural prod-
ucts across the border, also helped.36 This economic recrudescence resulted in
China’s becoming Russia’s third-largest export market and its second most im-
portant trading partner after Germany. (Russia became China’s seventh-largest
commercial partner.)
Nevertheless, while Russian manufacturers have been able to sell weapons to
China, as well as some advanced technology in the fields of nuclear energy and
aerospace, Chinese importers have preferred to acquire most other categories of
advanced technology from the West. Russian government and business leaders
reacted with dismay in 1997 when the Chinese rejected their tender to help con-
struct hydroelectric power generators for the Three Gorges Dam. Rather than
reward Russia for its political and military cooperation, the Chinese govern-
ment selected on commercial grounds a consortium of European firms for the
$750 million contract. Grandiose Russian proposals to sell oil, gas, and surplus
electric power in Siberia to China also remain unfulfilled. The ineffective legal,
regulatory, financial, and insurance systems of both countries confront traders
and investors with additional obstacles. As one Russian analyst lamented,
Sino-Russian trade continues to “rely disproportionately on ‘shuttle-traders’
and arms dealers.”37 As of the end of 2002, only 1,100 firms involving some Rus-
sian capital have invested in China (with an estimated $250 million), and less
than five hundred enterprises with some Chinese capital have invested in Russia
(with approximately the same $250 million volume of investments).38 Few of the
many registered Russian-Chinese joint ventures have become functional.39
As a result of these impediments, Chinese-Russian trade flows have fallen
far short of the ambitious goal their presidents established at their April 1996
summit—twenty billion dollars by the year 2000. When Jiang and Vladimir
Putin, Russia’s new president, met in Beijing in July 2000, they termed their bi-
lateral economic and trade relations “unsatisfactory.”40 The chairman of the
Russian Duma’s International Affairs Committee, Dmitri Rogozin, acknowl-
edged, “Moscow and Beijing are primarily concerned at the imbalance between
political and economic cooperation, which is effectively zero today.”41 Much
commerce still involves barter arrangements rather than the hard currency deals
Russia, which typically enjoys a substantial trade surplus with China, so desper-
ately wants. Even arms sales suffer from this problem. In 1993 China remitted
four-fifths of the purchase price of Su-27 aircraft in the form of goods.42 Arms
purchases also produce constant disagreements over the prices and technical
specifications of weapon systems, as well as Chinese pressure for offsets (favor-
able nonfinancial side-agreements, such as licenses). Russians prefer to sell
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off-the-shelf items, while the Chinese favor joint or licensed production arrange-
ments that transfer Russian technology and manufacturing capabilities to China.43
The discrepancy between China’s stagnant economic relations with Russia
and its burgeoning commercial ties with many other countries has been re-
flected in a steady shrinkage in the percentage of Chinese foreign commerce in-
volving Russia. The bottom line is that whereas during the heyday of the
Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s over half of China’s total annual trade involved
Russia, the corresponding figure today is approximately 2 percent. (In 2000 and
early 2001, only 3–5 percent of Russia’s trade was with China.)44 From Beijing’s
point of view, its annual bilateral trade with the United States and with Japan,
each worth over a hundred billion dollars, towers over its yearly trade volume
with Russia, which has never exceeded eleven billion. Revealingly, China and
Russia largely ignored each other when seeking to enter the World Trade Organi-
zation (Russia has yet to become a full member). Notwithstanding the comple-
mentary nature of their arms sales, both countries are basically competitors for
foreign investment from American and other Western sources.
Still a Top-Down (and Skin-Deep) Process
Encounters between Russian and Chinese leaders have become institutional-
ized. A pattern of annual summits between presidents developed during the
1990s. Furthermore, the prime ministers of the two countries agreed in Decem-
ber 1996 to meet biannually in a format similar to the “Gore-Chernomyrdin”
framework initiated by the former American vice president and the Russian
prime minister. This structure employs a preparatory committee, headed by vice
prime ministers, that addresses a range of security and nonsecurity issues. Bilat-
eral working groups of lower-level officials iron out details and manage imple-
mentation of agreements. Meetings also regularly occur between Chinese and
Russian foreign, defense, and economic ministers. The two countries have
signed over a hundred intergovernmental agreements and a comparable num-
ber of interregional and interagency accords.45
But contacts among the two countries’ regional authorities and private citi-
zens have lagged far behind those of senior officials. For many years, local politi-
cal dynamics in the Russian Far East presented serious barriers to cross-border
trade and other contacts between Russians and Chinese. Although Russians liv-
ing near China desired Chinese consumer goods, many of them feared illegal
Chinese immigration could lead to their de facto incorporation into China.46
Former Russian defense minister Pavel Grachev even remarked that “persons of
Chinese nationality are conquering the Russian Far East through peaceful
means.”47 A few years later, in February 1998, Chinese prime minister Li Peng felt
compelled to say that the increased flow of Chinese citizens into Russia did not
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represent a “secret colonization.”48 In fact, aside from those few Chinese business
people who find Russian spouses, most Chinese traders see Russia mainly as a
place to make money—not as a home.49
The source of much anti-Chinese feeling in Russia has been the demographic
and economic disparities existing between Russians and Chinese, which have
encouraged Chinese migration to Russia. The seven million inhabitants of the
Russian Far East (representing about 5 percent of Russia’s total population, and
about five hundred thousand fewer inhabitants than in 1992) live in a region of
2.4 million square miles (representing around 28 percent of the Russian Federa-
tion’s total area), a mean population density of only 1.3 persons per square kilo-
meter. In contrast, over a hundred million Chinese live in the border provinces
of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning, resulting in a population density fifteen to
twenty times greater. Furthermore, China’s rapid economic growth has ob-
scured the fact that its standard of living still lags behind that of Russia. North-
eastern China has not experienced the rapid economic growth or prosperity of
the southeastern part of the country, and its aging heavy industries cannot pro-
vide adequate employment for local workers. Chinese laborers who work in
Russia typically earn higher wages than they would at home.50
The failure of economic and social exchanges to follow the paths desired by
the two central governments represents a telling example of the top-down na-
ture of the Chinese-Russian rapprochement. The improved relations between
their leaders have not extended to the larger societies. Igor Ivanov, Russia’s for-
eign minister, recently revealingly described “genuine people-to-people diplo-
macy” between Russians and Chinese as “an untapped potential for further
consolidation of our relations.”51 Even at the elite level, the men and women who
once lived and studied in the former USSR are yielding their leading positions,
through retirement or death, to English-speaking technocrats.52 Unlike among
Europeans, or between Europeans and Americans, grassroots ties linking ordi-
nary Russians and Chinese remain minimal. Tourism, cultural exchanges, and
other unofficial contacts lag far behind the growth in security relations. In terms
of popular values and culture, the two nations also sharply differ.53 The partner-
ship between the Chinese and Russian governments remains a largely
elite-driven project that, lacking deeper social roots, could wither as easily as the
earlier Sino-Soviet bloc.
Anti-U.S. Cooperation: Rhetoric versus Reality
Foreign policy cooperation between Russia and China has been much more visi-
ble in their joint approach to Central Asia than in other important areas—
despite their leaders’ calls for foreign-policy “coordination.”54 Their genuine desire
to counter what both consider excessive American power and influence in the
4 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
post–Cold War era manifests itself mostly rhetorically. Since the early 1990s, the
two governments have issued numerous joint communiqués in which they have
denounced various U.S. policies and called for a multilateral rather than a uni-
lateral (i.e., American-led) world. They also jointly sponsored resolutions in the
United Nations urging respect for the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,
which limited the U.S. ability to deploy defenses against Russian (and, by exten-
sion, Chinese) ballistic missiles. Most recently, they urged the United States and
its allies not to intervene militarily in Iraq without UN (e.g., their) approval.
Despite their common rhetoric, the two governments have taken no substan-
tive, joint steps to counter American power or influence. For example, they have
not pooled their military resources or expertise to overcome U.S. ballistic-missile
defense programs. One Chinese official threatened such anti-BMD cooperation
shortly after Yeltsin’s December 1999 visit to Beijing.55 The Director General for
Arms Control of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Sha Zukang, repeated the warn-
ing in May 2000.56 But such threats ended after Putin, on his July 2000 visit to
Italy, proposed that Russia and NATO cooperate to defend Europe against mis-
sile strikes—despite prior acknowledgment that Chinese officials were “suspi-
cious about Russian initiatives to create a non-strategic missile defence system in
Europe.”57 When asked about the prospects of a joint Chinese-Russian response
after the December 2001 U.S. decision to withdraw formally from the ABM Treaty,
President Putin told journalists, “Russia is strong enough to respond on its own to
any changes in the sphere of strategic stability.”58
An important indicator of the shallowness of Sino-Russian ties has been their
failure, despite the Russia-China “partnership,” to adopt a mutual defense agree-
ment such as the treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance that Mos-
cow and Beijing signed in February 1950. Representatives of both governments
have consistently dismissed the suggestions of such Russian analysts and politi-
cians as Roman Popkovich, chairman of the Duma Committee for Defense, and
A. V. Mitrofanov, chairman of the Duma Committee on Geopolitics, that a gen-
uine military alliance be established.59 Although both governments agreed in
July 2000 to begin drafting a Sino-Russian Treaty of Good Neighborliness,
Friendship and Cooperation, and signed it in July 2001, they made clear that
neither party had sought a military component in the accord.60 In addition, the
Chinese and Russian militaries have neither trained together nor taken other
steps that would allow them to conduct joint combat operations—even if their
governments wanted them.
Diverse Approaches toward Asia
The limits of foreign-policy harmonization between China and Russia are most
visible in East and South Asia, where the two governments have adopted sharply
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divergent positions on important issues. For instance, despite their mutual con-
cern about the May 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, Russia and China
have persisted in supporting their respective Cold War allies—India in the case
of Russia, and Pakistan in the case of China. PLA analysts and other Chinese se-
curity specialists continue to see India as a potential threat to China’s security.61
For these reasons, the Chinese have expressed irritation at Russia’s commitment
to provide India with nuclear reactors for its civilian nuclear power program.62
The Chinese also have resented Russia’s willingness to sell India advanced weap-
ons that Moscow has not offered to China, including certain fighter planes and
other military technology.63 Russian representatives reportedly have urged the
two governments to improve their relations, but with seemingly little effect.64 In
July 2001, a Russian newspaper reported that “informed sources” believed that
the Indians had rejected “through diplomatic channels” an effort by one of the
directors of the Russian aviation industry to involve the Chinese in a Russian-
Indian effort to develop a “fifth-generation combat aircraft.”65
Although Russia and China share important concerns on the Korean Penin-
sula, they have pointedly declined to coordinate their policies there. Neither
country desires a war or the use of weapons of mass destruction in Korea. They
both also want to keep the North Korean government mollified as they im-
prove their own ties with South Korea. But in both 1994 and 2002–2003, they
resisted separately U.S. threats to impose international sanctions against
North Korea to deter Pyongyang from developing nuclear weapons. Moscow
refused to renew the 1961 Soviet–North Korean Friendship and Mutual Assis-
tance Treaty, which had a military intervention clause, when it expired in Sep-
tember 1996. The two governments agreed only to a watered-down treaty of
friendship, good-neighborliness, and cooperation in February 2000. The new
document provides for nothing more than consultations in the case of security
threats. Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov described military cooperation
and sales between Russia and North Korea as of mid-2000 as “virtually absent,”
owing to the latter’s financial problems.66 Russia began in 1996 to provide South
Korea with “defensive weapons,” to cover the commercial debt with Seoul that it
had inherited from the USSR. In contrast, former president Jiang Zemin stated
that China had no plans to abrogate its defense treaty with North Korea.67 As a
result, China has become North Korea’s closest ally.
Most tellingly, Chinese representatives resisted giving Russia a formal role in
the four-party negotiations on establishing peace in Korea. As leaders of a state
bordering the peninsula, Russian officials were understandably concerned
about the implications for their security of either Korea’s nuclearization or re-
unification. Although neither development would necessarily have threatened
Russia directly, either could have affected U.S. and Japanese defense interests,
5 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
which in turn would have influenced China’s security policies, all of which
would have affected Russia. For these reasons, Russian representatives com-
plained that the agenda, goal, and membership of the four-party talks were too
narrow and declared that the future of Northeast Asia “cannot be decided unless
all countries in this region participate.”68 In July 2003, a Russian Foreign Minis-
try spokesperson said that Russia’s participation in any multilateral talks regard-
ing the situation on the Korean Peninsula would be “logical.”69
With respect to Japan, Russia and China likewise have coordinated only rhet-
oric—and their statements have not always converged. Although the joint April
1997 Russian-Chinese declaration did affirm opposition to “enlarging and
strengthening military blocs,” Russian officials have evinced much less concern
about U.S.-Japanese security ties than their Chinese counterparts.70 (Chinese
leaders desire neither a strong U.S.-Japan alliance, which could work to contain
China, nor a weak alliance, which might collapse and lead to Japan’s remilitari-
zation.)71 On a visit to Japan in May 1997, then Russian defense minister Igor
Rodionov even praised the Japanese-American alliance as contributing to re-
gional security, an assessment shared by other Russians anxious about China’s
increasing economic and military strength in East Asia.72 From Moscow’s per-
spective, periodically joining Beijing to denounce U.S.-Japanese defense coop-
eration elicits, at minimal cost, Chinese declarations against NATO enlargement
and other Western policies the Russian government opposes. The appearance of
an embryonic Russian-Chinese united front toward Japan also encourages To-
kyo to moderate its claims of sovereignty over the Russian-occupied southern is-
lands of the Kurile chain—Habomai, Shikotan, Etorofu, and Kunashiri, known
in Japan as the “Northern Territories.”73 One could expect the Japanese to recall
that they were the principal target of the three previous treaties between Mos-
cow and Beijing (in 1896, 1924, and 1950). During the last decade, Chinese offi-
cials have expressed renewed support for Russia’s position on the Kurile issue.74
After supporting Japan during the 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese government
adopted a neutral stance in the 1990s following the USSR’s disintegration. The
status quo, in fact, best promotes China’s security interests. The unresolved
Kurile dispute impedes a close Russian-Japanese relationship and helps place
Beijing in the advantageous position of having better relations with Moscow
and Tokyo than they have with each other.75
Furthermore, Russia has offered only declaratory and symbolic support for
China’s stance on Taiwan. In September 1992, Yeltsin recalled Russia’s unofficial
diplomatic mission from Taipei and signed a decree committing Russia to a
“one-China” policy. He made these decisions after Beijing had protested that a
Yeltsin aide had visited the island and signed an accord on exchanging
semiofficial representation between Russia and Taiwan.76 During his visit to the
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People’s Republic of China three months later and subsequently, he said that
Russia would maintain only nongovernmental relations (i.e., nonofficial eco-
nomic and cultural links) with Taiwan.77 The connection between Chinese sup-
port for Russia’s policies in Chechnya and Russian support for China’s position
on Taiwan manifested itself clearly in the text of the December 1999 joint com-
muniqué following the second informal summit between Yeltsin and Jiang:
“The Russian Side supported the principled position of the People’s Republic of
China with regard to Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China voiced its support
to the Russian Federation’s actions aiming to fight terrorism and separatism in
Chechnya.”78 As with Beijing’s own relations with Taipei, however, these political
differences have not impeded substantial economic ties between Moscow and
Taipei. Taiwan regularly ranks on an annual basis as Russia’s fourth-largest trad-
ing partner in Asia. Furthermore, Chinese officials have complained repeatedly
that local Russian officials have established excessively close links with the Tai-
wanese government.79
The question of which country would lead a Chinese-Russian alliance pres-
ents a major psychological impediment to the formation of any formal bloc. Un-
like in the 1950s, Chinese authorities will no longer follow Moscow’s guidance in
international affairs as a matter of course. Influential Russians in turn have
evinced little interest in according Beijing primacy. Foreign policy analyst
Dmitry Trenin observed that China, rather than Russia, would likely lead any
geopolitical coalition against the United States: “Having refused to become the
USA’s junior partner, Russia could turn into the PRC’s vassal.”80 This impedi-
ment likely becomes stronger as Russia’s military power, its main source of polit-
ical influence in East Asia, declines and China’s economy surges ahead. During
the 1990s, whereas China’s GDP increased by 152 percent, Russia’s declined by 47
percent.81 As Putin himself noted, this divergence in growth rates has resulted in
a stark transformation in the balance of economic power between the two coun-
tries since 1990, when China and Russia had approximately equal GDPs.82 Today,
although the Russians’ per capita gross domestic product is still approximately
four times greater than that of the Chinese, China’s aggregate GDP is four or five
times Russia’s.83 Many influential Russians fear the long-run implications for Rus-
sia’s security of China’s growing economic and military potential.84
For their part, Chinese leaders have displayed more reluctance than their
Russian counterparts even to suggest that they aim to establish an anti-
American bloc. They studiously ignored then Russian prime minister Yevgeni
Primakov’s suggestion of a tripartite alliance among China, Russia, and India.85
The Chinese describe their relationship with Russia as a “strategic partner-
ship,” the same phrase they use to characterize their ties with the United
States.86 They have characterized China’s approach to Japan in similar terms.87
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Chinese representatives repeatedly affirm that “three noes” govern their policy to-
ward Russia: “no alliances, no oppositions, and no targets against a third country.”88
The current global war on terrorism has provided a further telling example of
how China and Russia have failed to unite to counter American preeminence—
even in the neighboring region of Central Asia. Neither government actively op-
posed the vast increase in the U.S. military presence there, which has seen
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and several other governments host U.S. military bases
on their territory. Rather than offer joint or even unilateral resistance, the Rus-
sian and Chinese governments have contented themselves with gaining Wash-
ington’s tolerance for their respective “antiterrorist” campaigns in southern
Russia and western China. The Russian military even assisted allied operations
in Afghanistan with intelligence and other support. Although Russian leaders
opposed the U.S.-British invasion of Iraq, their diplomats cooperated more with
the French and German governments than with their Chinese colleagues in
seeking to avert the attack.89
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
The decade-long improvement in Russian-Chinese relations has yet to evolve
into an anti-American bloc—and it probably won’t. Although both govern-
ments complain about various U.S. economic and security policies, their oppo-
sition on specific cases has been largely uncoordinated and rhetorical. While
they denounce “hegemonism” and use other code words to criticize American
foreign policy, they have preferred to deal with the United States bilaterally
rather than as a united front. Even their mutual opposition to NATO’s military
campaign against Serbia, which the allies justified on human rights grounds that
Russian and Chinese officials feared could later be used against them, did not
prompt them to create an anti-U.S. or anti-NATO alliance. Instead, Russian offi-
cials eventually pressured the Serbian government to yield to Western pressure.
Similarly, neither the May 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Bel-
grade nor the April 2001 midair collision between an American EP-3E surveil-
lance aircraft and a Chinese fighter induced Beijing to seek still closer strategic
ties with Moscow. After failing to extract concessions from Washington on unre-
lated disputes (such as the terms for China’s entry into the World Trade Organi-
zation), Chinese authorities decided to downplay the events. They evidently
feared that their outcries about the bombing and the midair incident, combined
with the negative fallout from the Chinese nuclear spy scandal in the United
States, were excessively damaging Chinese-American ties. Moscow and Beijing
also eventually accepted the U.S.-led military operation against Iraq and sup-
ported a new U.N. Security Council resolution that authorized the occupying
powers to govern the country until a new indigenous government emerged.
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Cooperation between China and Russia has remained limited, episodic, and
tenuous. The two countries support each other on some issues but differ on oth-
ers. Thus far, their fitfully improving relationship has not presented a major pol-
icy challenge to the United States or its allies. Russian arms sales have not been of
sufficient quantity or quality by themselves to enable China to defeat the more
technologically advanced militaries of Taiwan or Japan. In fact, China has im-
ported less military equipment in dollar terms than either of those countries.
The PLA typically buys small quantities of advanced weapons in order to learn
about their technologies and how to counter them.90 As a result of this practice
of selective modernization, only a few “pockets of excellence” exist within the
PLA. Most of the Chinese military still relies on pre-1970s Soviet defense tech-
nology. China’s ability even to maintain its complex, imported weapons systems
or make the doctrinal and organizational changes necessary to employ modern
military technology optimally in combined arms operations remains question-
able.91 The expected increase in the quality of China’s defense industries, the
continued decline of Russia’s military-industrial complex, and Russia’s stated
refusal to sell its most advanced weapon systems to a modernizing PLA could
decrease the importance of the Sino-Russian arms trade in the future.
The Chinese-Russian rapprochement appears so prominent largely because
it contrasts so vividly with their recent enmity and because they both lack close
allies. Resentful about lying outside the core American-European-Japanese axis
now dominating international politics, they naturally both try to gravitate to-
ward the West and simultaneously seek mutual solace for their isolation in each
other’s loose embrace. In some respects, they are following the path set by Ger-
many and the USSR during the 1920s with their Rapallo Treaty and cooperative
military programs. Ironically, the better ties between the two countries, as well
as Russia’s improved relations with France and Germany, may work in Washing-
ton’s favor by reassuring foreign observers concerned about potential American
hegemony.
The U.S. government nevertheless should pursue several policies designed to
prevent Russia and China from developing a genuine strategic alliance, which
could impede the attainment of important American foreign-policy goals. Al-
though the probability of such a bloc is low, the negative consequences for U.S.
policies in East Asia and elsewhere could be quite severe should one emerge.
Washington also needs to hedge against the possibility that unanticipated fac-
tors beyond its control will engender such an anti-American coalition.
Continued efforts to maintain strong U.S.-Japanese security ties represent an
essential hedging strategy against a Chinese-Russian military bloc, however im-
probable. The U.S.-Japanese alliance, unlike the weaker Sino-Russian align-
ment, involves extensive cooperation, and not only in the military sphere. More
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generally, U.S. officials should continue to retain robust military forces in the
Asia-Pacific region. Reductions in the size of the U.S. military presence in the
western Pacific could prove possible or even necessary, but they should proceed
in a deliberate manner and in close consultation with other governments. Re-
gardless of the numbers involved, the military presence, combined with
nonconfrontational commercial policies, reassures Asian countries about the
value of maintaining good relations with the United States. The likelihood that
most countries neighboring China and Russia would side with the West against a
Sino-Russian bloc presumably deters these two governments from seeking one.
U.S. policy makers also should continue to encourage reconciliation between
Russia and Japan. Better ties between Moscow and Tokyo would give Moscow an
alternative to aligning with China on Asian security issues. Furthermore, better
commercial ties between Moscow and Tokyo could improve the prospects that
the two countries will satisfactorily resolve the Kurile Islands dispute, perhaps
through some creative shared-sovereignty arrangement. But most Japanese and
other foreign investors will not enter Russia until Russian lawmakers create a
more favorable domestic economic climate.92 In the interim, enhanced coopera-
tion to deal with such mutual, low-level threats as drug trafficking and environ-
mental degradation might help start a reconciliation between these logical
economic partners.
Additional arms control measures could substantially improve regional mili-
tary transparency. Unfortunately, East Asian militaries traditionally have shown
little enthusiasm for arms control.93 Clarifying the quantity and quality of Rus-
sian arms sales to China warrants top priority. Seeking to guard against a
worst-case scenario, other countries might respond to the sales by increasing their
own defense efforts, which in turn could heighten security anxieties in China and
perhaps Russia. From such security spirals, dangerous arms races can arise.
American officials should try to deprive their Chinese and Russian counter-
parts of opportunities to confront the United States jointly. When negotiating
divisive issues with these two countries, U.S. representatives should employ in-
stitutions in which either China or Russia, but not both, are members. For this
reason, the new NATO-Russian Council or the Organization for the Security
and Cooperation of Europe (OSCE) would provide a better framework than the
UN Security Council for resolving military differences between NATO members
and Russia. Similarly, Russian and Chinese concerns over American TBMD, or
U.S. complaints about Chinese and Russian commercial and legal practices
(such as those affecting intellectual property rights), are best handled bilaterally.
In this respect, the current practice of excluding Russia from the four-party
peace talks on Korea has the advantage of not encouraging concerted Chinese-
Russian action on that issue.
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As a general rule, however, Washington should try to include Russia in East
Asian institutions or negotiations. Such a policy would recognize that
two-thirds of Russia’s territory lies in Asia and that many Russians identify their
nation as Eurasian. Overtly trying to circumscribe Russia’s role in East Asia
would encourage Moscow to turn more toward China. Integrating Russia into
East Asia’s numerous (though weak) institutions would provide for Russian rep-
resentation independent of Beijing.
Two objectives that might well come into conflict are limiting joint Chinese-
Russian institutional involvement and pursuing important arms control goals.
China’s exports of ballistic missiles and technologies related to nuclear weapons
already work against U.S. nonproliferation objectives. Furthermore, China’s re-
fusal to participate in strategic nuclear arms control negotiations could impede
U.S.-Russian progress in this area. Inviting Chinese representatives to enter into
exclusive trilateral arms control talks with Russia and the United States might
induce their participation, since it would underline China’s status as a great
power. Issues warranting trilateral discussions could include reducing strategic
nuclear forces, banning antisatellite weapons, and especially managing ballistic
missile proliferation.
In this regard, U.S. ballistic-missile defense programs should not even appear
to undermine the viability of Russia’s or China’s nuclear deterrents. The fact that
both Russia and China possess secure retaliatory nuclear forces removes a com-
mon factor underpinning most military alliances—shared vulnerability. Each
state can defend itself, by itself. China’s and Russia’s assured capacity to launch a
retaliatory nuclear strike against the United States or other countries (including
each other) allows them to regard U.S. military superiority with a degree of equa-
nimity.94 No currently envisaged U.S. BMD architecture could negate this capac-
ity, and the quixotic pursuit of one would drive China and Russia closer together.
American efforts to dissuade Russia from selling arms to China will have to
focus on especially disruptive systems. For reasons discussed earlier, Russians
will want to continue to sell weapons to China. A comprehensive U.S. attempt to
bloc Russian arms sales would prove counterproductive, but reasoned argu-
ments about the need to avoid transferring weapons that could enhance the
PLA’s ability to project military power far beyond China’s borders might per-
suade some Russian policy makers worried about harming Russia’s relations
with Washington or its Asian allies.
Russia and China will continue to work together to pursue common goals, but if
the events of the last few years—especially the U.S. military interventions in Ser-
bia, Afghanistan, and Iraq—have not galvanized them to form an anti-American
alliance, it is hard to envisage what will. The global war on terrorism should if
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anything improve relations among China, Russia, and the United States because
their governments all consider radical Islamic terrorism their most pressing se-
curity threat. Just as fears of a revanchist Russia or an expansionist China have
faded in official Washington during the past year, so policy makers in Moscow
and Beijing have become preoccupied with problems other than potential
American hegemony. If a new great power alliance emerges in Eurasia, the
United States will more likely be its member than its target.
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